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Abstract
In political environments, the process of developing new policies often involves competing
factions or entrepreneurs, who make productive investments to make their proposals more
appealing to decisionmakers. The ideologies and abilities of these factions is often highly
asymmetric, e.g., competition over industrial policy between interest groups and consumer
advocacy organizations. In this paper we extend the competitive policy development model
of Hirsch & Shotts (2015) to understand productive policy competition between asymmetric
entrepreneurs, and analyze how entrepreneurs’ extremism and costs of crafting high-quality
proposals affect patterns of competition and policy outcomes. We show that with arbi-
trary asymmetries the model exhibits a unique equilibrium, and analytically characterize
equilibrium strategies, outcomes, and payoffs. We also show that a more ideologically ex-
treme or more skilled entrepreneur is more likely to develop a policy, develops more extreme
policies, and is more likely to win. Nevertheless, she also provides greater benefits to the
decisionmaker once her proposals’ endogenously-chosen quality is accounted for. Finally,
when the entrepreneurs are highly asymmetric, one entrepreneur almost always wins, but
the decisionmaker nevertheless benefits from the potential for competition.
1 Introduction
In political organizations, the process of developing new policies typically involves competing
actors with differing objectives and abilities. For example, a legislature considering major
legislation will often solicit competing bills from committee chairmen with substantially
differing ideologies, as was the case within both the House and the Senate during drafting of
the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (2010). Legislatures also routinely consider
competing proposals from opposing interest groups like trade associations and consumer
advocacy groups, who may be equally ideologically extreme but have highly asymmetric
resources. In bureaucratic politics, each subunit within a government agency may develop
its own proposal for consideration by the agency head, and these subunits typically have
differing funding levels and staff expertise. Finally, this pattern is not restricted to the public
sector; on the contrary, many NGOs, universities, and firms have different factions within
them that exert effort to craft competing proposals that they hope will be implemented.
We use the term “policy entrepreneur” to refer to an individual, faction, or interest group
that takes the initiative to develop a policy, without any guarantee that it will be adopted. Of
course, policy entrepreneurs often disagree–both with each other and with decisionmakers–
about a variety of things. These disagreements may be ideological, or they may be about the
organization’s mission and the relative importance of different objectives. Yet despite their
disagreements, people in a political organization usually have some interests in common.
To the extent that there are overarching organizational goals, they (ceteris paribus) prefer
policies that more effectively achieve them. When possible they prefer to save money, or to
make money in the case of a for-profit firm. And, other things being equal, they prefer to
enhance the organization’s status and prestige.
In this paper we seek to understand policy competition between entrepreneurs who are
asymmetric, because of differing degrees of ideological extremism, differing abilities at devel-
oping policy proposals, or both. To do so, we generalize the competitive policy development
model of Hirsch & Shotts (2015), which in turn builds on previous research on all-pay con-
tests (e.g., Che & Gale (2003), Siegel (2009)). The foundation of the model two-fold. First,
there is a continuous policy space with two dimensions: an ideological dimension over which
players have different preferences, and a quality dimension that is common value. Second, the
participants in the contest, i.e., the entrepreneurs, are fundamentally policy motivated–they
care about the ideology and quality of the policy that is ultimately implemented, and their
motive for winning is purely instrumental. The model thus features what Baye, Kovenock &
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Vries (2012) term second order rank order spillovers ; the utility of the second-ranked player –
i.e. the loser – depends directly on the policy that the winner development. Baye, Kovenock
& Vries (2012) develop a symmetric, unidimensional model to use to analyze auctions, R&D
contests, litigation, and price competition. The spillovers in our model are more complex,
however, because the entrepreneurs care about, and make choices on, both the ideological
dimension and the quality dimension. Our model is thus more appropriate for analyzing
policy development in political organizations.
The sequence of the model is as follows. Two competing policy entrepreneurs simultane-
ously choose specific ideological locations at which to develop policies, and also how much
to invest in producing quality. Each entrepreneur has an ideal ideological outcome xi and
marginal cost of developing quality αi. Their investments are costly and cannot be combined
or transferred to other policies. A decisionmaker with an ideal ideological outcome xD = 0
located between them chooses one of the entrepreneurs’ proposals or a “reservation policy”
that is already available to the decisionmaker. The decisionmaker can neither commit ex-
ante to a decision rule, nor pay the entrepreneurs to reward them for developing particular
policies. Rather, he must simply choose among the available options. This assumption re-
flects the fact that leaders in many political organizations have access to a very-limited set of
rewards and punishments (Moe 1984), and that commitment is often difficult or impossible.
To gain the support of the decisionmaker, the entrepreneurs use a combination of ideo-
logical concessions and productive quality investments. The primary reason an entrepreneur
invests in quality is to reduce her need to make ideological concessions. As shown in Hirsch
& Shotts (2015), an important intermediate result that applies to both the symmetric and
asymmetric model is that ideologically-extreme policies are not bad for a centrist decision-
maker in equilibrium – when extreme policies are developed, they are sufficiently high quality
to overcompensate the decisionmaker for his ideological losses.
We first show that equilibria are in two-dimensional mixed strategies. We provide neces-
sary and sufficient conditions for equilibrium, and show that strategies are characterized by
a univariate probability distribution over the decisionmaker’s utility, combined with simple
functions associating each utility with a unique combination of ideology and quality. The
equilibrium probability distributions are characterized by a straightforward system of differ-
ential equations. Next, we show that equilibria always exist and are unique, and we provide
an analytical characterization of equilibrium strategies and players’ payoffs.
In Hirsch & Shotts (2015) it is shown that with symmetric participants, the unique equi-
librium is symmetric, both entrepreneurs always enter the contest, and they each win with
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equal probability. The decisionmaker always benefits from joint increases in the ideological
extremism of the entrepreneurs or in their abilities, even though greater extremism of the
resulting policies is exhibited as a byproduct. Finally, the entrepreneurs sometimes benefit,
and are sometimes harmed, by common increases in their skill at policy development.
In this paper, we show that for generic asymmetric parameters, participation in the
contest is asymmetric; one entrepreneur is more engaged, i.e., she enters the contest with
probability 1, whereas the other one sometimes sits out. The probability that the less-
engaged entrepreneur sits out is a function of the two entrepreneurs’ preferences and costs,
and for extremely asymmetric values of these parameters it converges to 1. However, this
does not imply that the model functions as if the less-engaged entrepreneur did not exist
(in which case the more-engaged entrepreneur could extract all quality benefits for herself,
in the form of ideological rents). Rather, the seldom (and in the limit never) realized entry
of the less-engaged entrepreneur induces the more-engaged entrepreneur to develop policies
that strictly benefit the decisionmaker, even in the limit.
We also show that the more-engaged entrepreneur may not dominate the contest. Rather,
if she is more ideologically-extreme yet faces a sufficiently large cost disadvantage, her oppo-
nent is more likely to win the contest, despite being less likely to enter. On the other hand,
if the more-engaged entrepreneur is both more ideologically-extreme and more cost-effective
at developing quality, then compared to her opponent she will develop policies that are (in
a first-order stochastic sense) more extreme and also better for the decisionmaker.
Finally, the model yields intuitive comparative statics. Each entrepreneur is worse off
when her opponent’s costs decrease. Lower costs make it cheaper to develop any given level
of quality, and thus easier to realize ideological gains. As an entrepreneur’s costs decrease,
she develops more-extreme policies, and her opponent develops more moderate ones. The
effect of increasing one entrepreneur’s ideological extremism is, for the most part, similar
to decreasing her costs: her policies become more extreme, her opponent’s policies become
moderate, and her opponent is worse off.
Literature The canonical approach to studying the endogenous development of high-
quality policies is Crawford & Sobel’s (1982) model, in which experts acquire information
about an unknown state of the world. Such models have been widely applied within po-
litical science to study the institutional determinants of high-quality policies (Gailmard &
Patty 2012). They also feature information that is effectively transferable across policies, a
property that (Callander 2008) terms “invertibility” and criticizes for being unrealistic.
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Our model instead assumes that quality is endogenous, common knowledge, and policy-
specific (Ting 2011, Hirsch & Shotts 2012). It is thus better suited to empirical domains
in which information and expertise are not readily transferable across different approaches
to the same organizational problem.1 For example, information about how to design an
effective and equitable school voucher program cannot be used to improve the quality of
public schools. Similarly, when one division within a firm develops a new product, this
doesn’t help another division that is developing a completely different product that it wants
the firm to focus on. Or, if we consider adoption of a “policy” to be the election of a
particular party to control the government, then a party that makes productive investments
in its own capacity to govern–e.g., by developing a well thought-out platform or by improving
recruitment and training of its candidates and bureaucrats–knows that the benefits of its
investments are only realized in the event that it actually wins office.2
Because quality is policy-specific in our model, an entrepreneur does not need to worry
about being expropriated, but rather attempts to exploit her investments to encourage the
decisionmaker to select her policy. This effect is akin to Aghion & Tirole’s (1997) “real
authority,” in that a decisionmaker who wishes to benefit from an entrepreneur’s efforts must
select her policy. However, the investments are wasted if that policy is not selected. The
model adds to a growing political economy literature on strategic development of valence,
i.e., common value dimensions of policy, in both single-actor and competitive sequential
models. Lax & Cameron (2007) consider a sequential model of costly development of high-
quality Supreme Court opinions; Ting (2011) and McCarty (2013) analyze development of
bureaucratic expertise; and Hirsch & Shotts (2012) and Hitt, Volden & Wiseman (2014)
analyze the development of high-quality Congressional legislation.
Finally, the model is analytically related to models of competing political candidates who
choose ideological platforms and make costly (but wasteful) up-front investments to increase
their chances of electoral victory. Wiseman (2006) studies candidates who sequentially select
platforms and a level of costly electoral support, and Ashworth & Bueno de Mesquita (2009)
model candidates who simultaneously choose policy platforms and then levels of campaign
spending. Our model is distinct from this literature in that investments in policy quality
1See Callander (2011) for a model in which learning about one policy option provides information that
is useful for small policy changes, but not necessarily for major ones.
2This example, like a few others later in the paper, stretches the definition of “organization” from its
typical usage, to include an entire polity. We note, however, that a political system is a way of organizing
collective decision making.
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are productive and common value. However, similar techniques can be adapted to analyze
costly campaign expenditures.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 introduces the model. Section 3 develops
concepts and notation, and then presents some general results. Section 4 provides an ana-
lytical characterization of equilibria and general comparative statics. Section 5 considers the
symmetric model, and Section 6 considers specific asymmetric variants. Section 7 concludes.
2 The Model
We analyze a two-stage game of policy development and choice played by two competing
entrepreneurs and a decisionmaker. Policies in the model have two components: ideology
y ∈ R and quality q ∈ [0,∞) = R+. Thus, a policy is a point in a subset of two-dimensional
real space, b = (y, q) ∈ R×R+ = B. Players’ utility functions Ui (b) over the two dimensions
are additive, and quality is valued equally by all players:
Ui (b) = q − (xi − y)2
where xi denotes player i
′s ideological ideal point. We assume without loss of generality
that the decisionmaker’s ideal ideology is xD = 0, and furthermore assume that the two
entrepreneurs are on strictly opposite sides of the decisionmaker, i.e., xL < 0 < xR.
In the policy development stage, each entrepreneur i ∈ {L,R} simultaneously develops
a policy bi = (yi, qi) ∈ B with ideology yi and quality qi ≥ 0. We assume for simplicity
that the cost of developing quality qi is ci (qi) = αiqi where αi > 1. Thus, the cost is linear
and independent of ideology yi, and policies with 0 quality are costless. The net benefit of
producing quality is (1− αi) qi < 0, so an entrepreneur will only develop quality to increase
the probability that her policy will be selected.
In the policy choice stage, the decisionmaker chooses from the set of newly-developed
policies b ∈ B2 or a reservation policy b0 = (0, 0), i.e., the decisionmaker’s ideal ideology
with 0 quality. These assumptions capture the idea that the decisionmaker can choose freely
from the 0-quality policies, and that quality is policy-specific (Hirsch & Shotts 2012).
As described in Hirsch & Shotts (2015), the game is effectively a multidimensional all-pay
contest (Che & Gale 2003, Siegel 2009), with two features that distinguish it from previous
models. First, the entrepreneurs are policy motivated rather than rent seeking (as in Tullock
(1980) and Baye, Kovenock & Vries (1993). They care about which policies are implemented
even if they lose, so the contest features what Baye, Kovenock & Vries (2012) refer to as rank
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order spillovers. Second, in the model the investments made to gain influence are productive,
and not simply transfers to the decisionmaker. These differences stem from the fact that
the model is designed to apply to policy-motivated actors in political organizations, where
people have both divergent ideological interests and common organizational interests.
3 Preliminary Analysis
We now introduce notation and derive necessary and sufficient conditions for equilibrium.
This preliminary analysis applies to both the symmetric variant originally considered in
Hirsch & Shotts (2015) as well as the asymmetric variant considered herein.3
The model is a variant of an all-pay contest (Siegel 2009), with some distinctive properties.
As in Che & Gale (2003) the contest is multidimensional because policies (yi, qi) are two-
dimensional. There is also a “score function” s (yi, qi) that determines the winner. In our
model, a policy’s score is the utility it provides to the decisionmaker, so the score function
is just s (y, q) = UD (y, q) = q − y2. The reason is that the decisionmaker cannot commit in
advance to which policy he will choose. Thus, he must always choose the policy with the
strictly highest score (and may randomize arbitrarily in the event of ties).
Also like Che & Gale (2003), there are a continuum of policies with different ideologies
that have the same score. These policies have different costs to develop; a policy with
ideology y and score s must have quality s + y2, so entrepreneur i’s cost to develop it is
αi (s+ y
2). In addition, the policies are valued differently by different players; entrepreneur
i’s utility from policy (s, y) is Ui (y, s+ y
2) = −x2i + s+ 2xiy. It is thus helpful to introduce
notation for these quantities, which allow us to treat an entrepreneur’s problem as the choice
of a score curve s and an ideology y to develop along that score curve.
Definition 1 Player i’s utility for a policy (s, y) with score s and ideology y is




= −x2i + s+ 2xiy.
The up-front cost to an entrepreneur of developing the policy herself is αi (s+ y
2).
Figure 1 depicts the game in ideology-quality space for entrepreneurs who are equidistant
from the decisionmaker. The decisionmaker’s indifference curves, i.e., the policies with equal
score, are depicted by green lines.
3This portion of the paper effectively integrates exposition in the main text of Hirsch & Shotts (2015)
with a more detailed treatment located in the proof of Lemma 1 in the online appendix to that paper.
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Figure 1:  Setup of the Policy Contest
s’’’
 xD
Necessary and Sufficient Conditions We first transform strategies (y, q) to be ex-
pressed in terms of score and ideology. An entrepreneur’s pure strategy (si, yi) is a two-
dimensional element of B ≡{(s, y) ∈ R2 | s+ y2 ≥ 0}, or the set of scores and ideologies that
imply positive-quality policies. A mixed strategy σi is a probability measure over the Borel
subsets of B, and let Fi (s) denote the CDF over scores induced by i’s mixed strategy σi.
For technical convenience we restrict attention to strategies generating score CDFs that can
be written as the sum of an absolutely continuous and a discrete distribution. The deci-
sionmaker is the last mover, so equilibrium requires that he choose a policy (s, y) with the
maximum score. While a complete description also requires specifying his tie-breaking rules,
equilibria are invariant to this decision so we omit the additional notation.
We now derive necessary and sufficient conditions for equilibrium using a series of lemmas.
First, let Πi (si, yi;σ−i) denote i’s expected utility from developing policy (si, yi) (suppressing
the dependence on the DM’s tie-breaking rules). At any score si > 0 where −i has no atom,







+ F−i (si) · Vi (si, yi) +
∫
s−i>si
Vi (s−i, y−i) dσ−i. (1)
Taking the first order condition with respect to yi yields the following essential Lemma.
Lemma 1 At any score si > 0 where the score CDF F−i (·) of i’s opponent has no atom,
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developing the policy (si, y
∗
i (si)), where




is strictly better for i than developing any other policy (si, yi).
Lemma 1 states that for almost every score si > 0, entrepreneur i’s best combination of
ideology yi and quality qi to generate that score is unique. Crucially, the optimal ideology-
quality combination does not depend on the specific policies that her opponent develops.
Instead, it is simply F−i (si) · xiαi , a weighted average of the entrepreneur and decisionmaker’s
ideal ideologies, multiplied by the probability F−i (si) that her opponent develops a lower-
score policy.4
Second, we establish that in equilibrium there is 0 probability of a tie at a strictly positive
score. The absence of “score ties” is an intuitive consequence of the all-pay nature of investing
in quality–if an entrepreneur knew that her policy might tie with her opponent’s policy or
the reservation policy, she could invest up-front in a bit more quality to break the tie.5
Lemma 2 In equilibrium there is 0-probability of a tie at scores s > 0.
Third, having ruled out ties at strictly positive scores, we next show that one of the
entrepreneurs must always be active, in the sense of developing a policy with score strictly
higher than 0 (the score that can be achieved for free “developing” the reservation policy).
In other words, Fk (0) > 0 for at most one k ∈ {L,R}, implying that k’s opponent −k is
always active (F−k (0) = 0).
Lemma 3 In equilibrium Fk (0) > 0 for at most one k ∈ {L,R}.
Lemmas 1 – 3 jointly imply that in equilibrium, player i can compute her expected utility







i’s utility from developing any (si, yi) with si > 0 where her opponent’s score CDF F−i has
no atom (or if a tie would be broken in her favor) can be written as







+ F−i (si) · Vi (si, yi)︸ ︷︷ ︸















4Lemma 1 is similar to Lemma 6 of Che & Gale (2003), in which the problem is simplified to choosing
a score, but the optimal way to achieve each score depends on the other player’s score CDF.
5Proving this property is more complex than in all-pay contests without spillovers, because the utility
from tying can be a complicated function of the opponent’s policies and the decisionmaker’s decision rule.
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i (si) ;F ), which we
henceforth denote Π∗i (si;F ).
Fourth and finally, we show that equilibrium score CDFs must satisfy the following
natural properties that arise from the all pay nature of the contest.
Lemma 4 The support of the equilibrium score CDFs over s ≥ 0 is common, convex, and
includes 0. In addition, both CDFs are atomless ∀s > 0.
To conclude, we combine the preceding lemmas to state a preliminary characterization
of all equilibria in the form of necessary and sufficient conditions.
Proposition 1 A strategy profile σ is a SPNE i.f.f. it satisfies the following conditions.
1. (Ideological Optimality) With Pr. 1, each entrepreneur develops policies with either
(a) negative score si ≤ 0 and 0-quality (si + y2i = qi = 0), or
(b) positive score si > 0 with ideology yi = y
∗
i (si) .
2. (Score Optimality) The profile of score CDFs (FL, FR) satisfy the following boundary
conditions and differential equations.
• (Boundary Conditions) Fk (0) > 0 for at most one entrepreneur k ∈ {L,R},
and there ∃s̄ > 0 such that lim
s→s̄
{Fi (s)} = 1 ∀i.
• (Differential Equations) For all i ∈ {L,R} and s ∈ [0, s] ,












Observations about Equilibria Proposition 1 implies that equilibria have a simple form.
First, at least one entrepreneur −k is always active – thus, competition always strictly bene-
fits the decisionmaker. The other entrepreneur k may also always be active (Fk (0) = 0) or be
inactive with strictly positive probability (Fk (0) > 0). Second, when either entrepreneur i is






with scores in a common mixing interval [0, s̄] according to the CDF Fi (s).
6
6Technically, the proposition does not state that the support interval is also bounded (s̄ <∞), but this
is later shown indirectly through the analytical equilibrium derivation.
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The differential equations that must be satisfied by equilibrium score CDFs arise in-
tuitively from the requirement that both entrepreneurs be indifferent over developing all
ideologically-optimal policies with scores in [0, s]. The left hand side of each differential
equation is i′s net marginal cost of producing a higher-score policy, given a fixed probability
F−i (s) of winning the contest; the entrepreneur pays marginal cost αi > 1 for sure, but with
probability F−i (s) her policy is chosen and she enjoys a marginal benefit of 1 (because she
values quality). The right hand side represents i′s marginal ideological benefit of producing
a higher score. Doing so increases by f−i (s) the probability that her policy wins, which












In addition, a robust feature of equilibria (also noted in Hirsch & Shotts (2015)) is that
more-extreme policies are not merely higher-quality than less-extreme ones. They are also
higher-score, so their additional quality overcompensates the decisionmaker for his ideological
losses. The decisionmaker thus prefers the more ideologically-extreme policies in the support
of each entrepreneur’s strategy. This is a general property, which follows immediately from










i , the higher-
score one wins the contest with higher probability F−i (s
′′
i ) > F−i (s
′
























i) of the lower-score one. Intuitively, a policy that gives greater
utility to the decisionmaker will be paired with a more-extreme ideology because it has a
higher chance of being selected, so the entrepreneur is more willing to pay the sure costs of
developing quality for the uncertain benefits of ideological change.
Finally, certain aspects of the strategies are irrelevant for equilibrium. The first of these
is the decisionmaker’s tie-breaking rule; this is a consequence both of the absence of ties at
positive scores, as well as the fact that one entrepreneur is always active. The second of these
is the exact way that a sometimes inactive entrepreneur k (if one exists) is inactive. She
could do so by “developing” the reservation policy with probability exactly equal to Fk (0),
i.e., having an atom at score 0. But she may also have an arbitrary CDF over scores s ≤ 0
generated by 0-quality proposals. The key thing is that she be “sometimes inactive” with
0-quality policies that are costless to develop, always lose the contest, and never influence a
tie between her opponent (who is always active) and the reservation policy.
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4 Symmetric Competition
Before proceeding with analysis of the asymmetric model, we first briefly review results from
the symmetric baseline model (x ≡ |xi| and α ≡ αi). Symmetric entrepreneurs yield a
unique symmetric equilibrium, which is restated in the following corollary to Proposition 1
and Corollary 1 of Hirsch & Shotts (2015).
Corollary 1 If x ≡ |xi| and α ≡ αi, there is a unique equilibrium in symmetric mixed strate-
gies. The entrepreneurs mix smoothly over policies with ideology and quality (yi, s (|yi|) + y2i ).
1. the extremism |yi| of each entrepreneur’s policies is uniformly distributed over [0, xα ]
2. the score of a policy with ideology yi is s









In the symmetric game, the entrepreneurs are both always active, and develop identically
extreme policies according to the same atomless score CDF. Figure 2 depicts equilibrium poli-
cies for different values of α, holding fixed x. The ideological distance of each entrepreneur’s






Figure 2: Equilibrium of the Symmetric Model










Figure 2: Symmetric Model Equilibrium
The symmetric model yields the following comparative statics in the extremism of the
entrepreneurs x and their costs of developing quality α, restated in the following corollary
to Propositions 2 and 3 of Hirsch & Shotts (2015).
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Corollary 2 If x ≡ |xi| and α ≡ αi, then
• the decisionmaker always chooses the most extreme proposal presented
• as the entrepreneurs become more extreme (higher x) or more skilled (lower α), their
proposals become first-order stochastically more extreme, but also first-order stochasti-
cally higher quality and better for the decisionmaker
• the entrepreneur’s equilibrium utility is first decreasing and then increasing in α
The symmetric equilibrium thus has four key properties. First, the decisionmaker always
chooses the more ideologically-extreme of the two proposals made, due to the combination
of symmetry and the equilibrium association between extremism and score. Second, while
more polarized entrepreneurs naturally produce more ideologically-extreme policies, they also
invest more in quality due to their greater desire to win, which benefits the decisionmaker
as a byproduct. Third, the effect of increasing the entrepreneurs’ skill is similar to the
effect of ideological polarization; more skilled entrepreneurs better exploit their abilities to
achieve ideological gains, which results in extreme policy proposals, but also benefits the
decisionmaker. Finally, the entrepreneurs may benefit from shared increases in their skill
because of the greater quality produced (when α is sufficiently low), but may also be harmed
because of the greater intensity of competition that results (when α is sufficiently high).
5 Asymmetric Competition
We now focus on the asymmetric model and fully characterize equilibria. One way to do
this is to use Proposition 1 to numerically compute equilibrium score CDFs for particular
parameter values. (We also note that the sequence of steps employed to derive Proposition 1
can also be used to derive necessary and sufficient conditions for variants of the model with
alternative functional forms and payoff assumptions better suited to other applications.)
Figure 3 depicts a typical mixed equilibrium of the asymmetric model, and illustrates
some key properties. The equilibrium depicted involves symmetrically located entrepreneurs
(−xL = xR) but a cost advantage for the right entrepreneur (αL > αR). The top panel
depicts entrepreneurs’ score CDFs. The right entrepreneur is always active due to her cost
advantage (FR (0) = 0), whereas the left entrepreneur is sometimes inactive (FL (0) > 0).
The right entrepreneur’s policies are better for the decisionmaker in a first-order stochastic
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sense; we later show that this property is a general feature of the game with symmetric
ideologies and asymmetric costs.
The bottom panel depicts the ideological locations and qualities of the policies over which
each entrepreneur mixes – that is, a parametric plot of
(
y∗i (s) , s+ (y
∗
i (s))
2) for s ∈ [0, s̄].
The ideological locations each entrepreneur i’s policies extend out to xi
αi
, which is the policy
she would develop absent competition. The right entrepreneur exploits her cost advantage
to develop more ideologically-extreme policies at every score, and overall her policies are
first-order stochastically more extreme. This is a general feature of symmetric ideologies
paired with asymmetric costs.












Figure 3: Equilibrium Score CDFs and Policies ( xL = -xR , αL > αR )























Figure 3: Equilibrium Score CDFs and Policies ( xL = -xR , αL > αR )
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While Proposition 1 can be used to numerically compute score CDFs satisfying the equilib-
rium conditions, analyzing the model in this fashion ensures neither existence nor uniqueness.
However, it turns out both properties always hold, up to the inconsequential decision which
0-quality policies the sometimes-inactive entrepreneur k develops. That is, the equilibrium
score CDFs are unique over positive scores s ≥ 0, and for negative scores (generated by
0-quality policies) their exact shape is irrelevant. Moreover, the unique equilibrium score
CDFs have an analytical characterization even with arbitrary asymmetries. We now provide
this characterization, describe how to compute closed form expressions for key equilibrium
properties, and analytically prove many properties of the resulting equilibria.
Proposition 2 Define the following notation.












entrepreneur i’s “engagement” at probability p,





to εi (1) = 1.
• Denote entrepreneur i’s engagement at probability 0 with εi, and let k denote the less-
engaged entrepreneur at probability 0.
• Let pi (ε) = ε−1i (ε) = αi − (αi − 1) ε
1
|xi| denote the unique probability such that i’s
engagement is equal to ε.
Then the unique score CDFs over s ≥ 0 satisfying Proposition 1 are F ∗i (s) = p−i (ε∗ (s)),










∣∣∣ xjαj ∣∣∣ · (pj (ε)− pj (εk))) .
The unique equilibrium score CDFs
(










, which we call entrepreneur i’s engagement at probability p. This quantity
captures an entrepreneur’s willingness to develop policies whose probability of winning the
contest is ≥ p, and is strictly decreasing in p. Whether an entrepreneur always enters the
contest or sometimes sits out depends on her engagement at probability 0, i.e. εi (0). We
henceforth denote this quantity as simply εi, and refer to it as entrepreneur i’s engagement
in the contest, or just her engagement. For the remainder of the paper we also denote the
less engaged entrepreneur using subscript k. In equilibrium, the less engaged entrepreneur
k mixes between entering and not entering the contest, i.e., Fk (0) > 0 if εk < ε−k. The
more-engaged entrepreneur −k always enters the contest (F−k (0) = 0).
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To understand the equilibrium construction, observe that when entrepreneur i develops
a policy at score s, the probability that she wins the contest is F−i (s). Thus, her willingness
to develop policies with score ≥ s is equal to εi (F−i (s)), which is decreasing in s. The
key property of equilibrium is that the entrepreneurs must be equally engaged at each score












αi − F ∗−i (s)
αi − 1
)|xi|
= ε∗ (s) (3)
Thus, in equilibrium every score s ∈ [0, s̄] is associated with a unique level of engagement
ε∗ (s) that is common to both entrepreneurs. Proposition 2 analytically characterizes the
inverse of this function, which is uniquely pinned down by the boundary conditions on(




. It is necessarily decreasing in s, because higher scores must be associated with a
greater probability of winning, and hence lower engagement.7
The main equilibrium quantities are then easily derived from the following: ε∗ (s) , the
equilibrium engagement associated with each score s; εi (p), entrepreneur i’s engagement
when she wins the contest with probability p; and pi (ε), i
′s probability of winning that
yields engagement ε. The probability F ∗i (s) that entrepreneur i develops a policy with score
≤ s is the unique probability of winning the contest p−i (ε∗ (s)) such that her competitor
−i’s engagement at score s is equal to ε∗ (s). Because i’s optimal ideology is a linear function







F−i (s), her unique optimal ideology







Activity Proposition 2 yields a closed form expression for the probability each entrepreneur
is active. Thus, we can analyze how the ideological extremism and costs of two competing
factions determine the probability that each faction will develop a policy proposal. In par-
ticular, we consider how one faction’s costs and extremism affect the other’s activity.
It is easy to verify from the inverse function s∗ (ε) that the engagement associated with
score s = 0 is εk, the engagement of the less-engaged entrepreneur k. Thus, the probability
that entrepreneur i is inactive is F ∗i (0) = p−i (εk), which gives the following corollary.
Corollary 3 In equilibrium
1. the more-engaged entrepreneur −k is always active
(
F ∗−k (0) = pk (εk (0)) = 0
)
.
7Equilibrium may alternatively be expressed in closed form using the inverse of the score CDFs.
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which is < 1 when εk < ε−k.
3. the probability that the less engaged entrepreneur k is active is strictly increasing in her
engagement εk, strictly increasing in her opponent’s costs α−k, and strictly decreasing
in her opponent’s extremism |x−k|.
Figure 4 is a contour plot of the probability that the less-engaged entrepreneur is active
as a function of the ideology xR and costs αR of the right entrepreneur, holding fixed the left
entrepreneur’s parameters (xL, αL). The white curve depicts where the two entrepreneurs
are equally engaged, and hence always active. In the purple region, the right entrepreneur
is less engaged. Here, decreases in her costs αR or increases in her ideological extremism
xR increase her engagement and thus the probability that she develops a policy. In the
blue region, in contrast, the right entrepreneur is more engaged and thus is always active.
However, her parameters (αR, xR) influence the probability that the left entrepreneur will be
active. Decreases in the right entrepreneur’s costs or increases in her extremism accentuate
the imbalance in engagement, and decrease the probability that the left entrepreneur will
develop a proposal. This comparative static is somewhat surprising given that (as we later
show) more-extreme entrepreneurs develop more-extreme policies, which seemingly could
give the less-engaged entrepreneur a greater incentive to develop a competing proposal.
Overall, the probability of observing direct competition – that is, both entrepreneurs
developing a strictly positive-quality policy – depends on how evenly the two entrepreneurs
are engaged in the contest. As their engagement becomes increasingly asymmetric, the
less-engaged one increasingly drops out.
Relative Strength Proposition 2 and the engagement equality in Equation 3 allow us to














while performing a change of variables (and recalling that Fi (0) = p−i (εk)) yields the fol-
lowing result.
Corollary 4 The probability that entrepreneur i wins the contest is
∫ 1
p−i(εk)
pi (ε−i (p)) dp,
which is strictly increasing in her ideological extremism |xi| and her opponent’s costs α−i,
and strictly decreasing in her costs αi and her opponent’s ideological extremism |x−i|.
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Figure 4: Effect of R’s Parameters on Probability of Direct Competition (xL = −1, αL = 2)
Figure 4: Effect of Right Entrepreneur’s Parameters on Probability 
of Direct Competition (xL = -1, αL = 2)
















Darker shading means 
higher probability direct 
competition
At white line, εL=εR  and 
both entrepreneurs always 
compete
Thus, each entrepreneur’s probability of victory responds naturally to changes in the
model’s parameters. As either entrepreneur becomes more ideologically motivated or bet-
ter able to develop quality, her probability of winning increases and her opponent’s corre-
spondingly decreases. Note that it is straightforward to evaluate the integral and write the
expression in reduced form, but the comparative statics are less transparent.
We can also apply Equation 3’s engagement equality to characterize when the more-
engaged entrepreneur score-dominates the policy contest, developing policies that are first-
order stochastically better for the decisionmaker.
Proposition 3 The more-engaged entrepreneur −k score-dominates the contest, i.e., F−k (s) <
Fk (s) ∀s ∈ [0, s̄), if and only if she is more engaged at every probability p, i.e., ε−k (p) >
εk (p) ∀p ∈ [0, 1).
Being more-engaged at probability 0, and thus more likely to enter the contest, is nec-
essary but not sufficient for entrepreneur −k to score-dominate the contest. Intuitively, the
reason is that the entrepreneurs place some intrinsic value on quality. Relative cost ad-
vantages become magnified when an entrepreneur develops higher-score policies, which are
more likely to be chosen and thus give the entrepreneur the direct benefits of her quality
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investment. Mathematically, if entrepreneur −k has higher costs (α−k > αk), then greater










, is an easier hurdle to satisfy











Ideology An important question is how ideologically extreme are the policies that the
entrepreneurs develop. Proposition 2 can be used to generate analytical characterizations of
i’s average ideological location E [yi] as well as her full probability distribution over ideologies.
The model can therefore predict how factions in an organization alter the ideology of their
proposals in response to changes in the underlying parameters of competition.
The average ideological location can be derived using our previous results. In terms of

















is equal to xi
αi
Pr(i wins).
To derive the full CDF over i’s policies, observe that the probability G (|yi|) that i




that i develops a score s less than y−1−i (yi). This probability can in turn be derived analytically
in two steps. First, the probability that i’s opponent −i develops a policy with score less than


































. The following corollary
summarizes these derivations.





pi (ε−i (p)) dp.
The ideological extremism |yi| of entrepreneur i’s policies is distributed according to











)∣∣∣ xix−i ∣∣∣ , which is first-order stochasti-
cally increasing in i’s ideological extremism |xi|, decreasing in her costs αi, decreasing in her
opponent’s ideological extremism |x−i|, and increasing in her opponent’s costs αi.
Unsurprisingly, when an entrepreneur’s extremism |xi| increases or her costs αi decrease,
she reacts by increasing the ideological extremism of her policies. In the former case she
is more motivated to exploit quality to realize ideological gains, and in the latter case she
is better able to do so. More interestingly, each entrepreneur reacts to increases in her
opponent’s ideological extremism |xi| and decreases in her opponent’s costs αi by moderat-
ing the ideological location of her own policies. Thus, increased ideological extremism by
one faction is necessarily accompanied by greater moderation from the competing faction.
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These comparative statics resemble those from Lax & Cameron’s (2007) sequential model of
endogenous quality development for U.S. Supreme Court opinions.
Our result that the cost-advantaged entrepreneur develops more-extreme policies con-
trasts sharply with Groseclose’s (2001) model of electoral competition, which predicts that
the higher-quality candidate chooses a moderate ideological platform. However, it is similar
to Lax and Cameron’s result that more-skillful opinion writers on the Supreme Court will
write more-ideological opinions. The reason for the difference is that Groseclose assumes
quality to be exogenous, so a candidate can only mitigate the effect of a pre-existing disad-
vantage or make use of a pre-existing advantage. In contrast, in our model (as well as Lax
and Cameron’s) quality is endogenous, and the benefit to entrepreneur i of having a lower
cost αi is that she finds it easier to craft high-quality policy proposals that are noncentrist
yet still appealing to the decisionmaker.
Payoffs We last characterize the players’ payoffs. Proposition 2 yields a closed form char-
acterization of the maximum score s̄; since F ∗i (s̄) = 1 = p−i (1), the maximum score is
simply the score s∗ (1) associated with an engagement of 1. An entrepreneur’s equilibrium
utility is equal to her utility Π∗i (s̄;F
∗) from developing the maximum score s̄, since it is
in the support of her strategy.8 Also, since the CDF of the winning score max {si, s−i}
is the product of the score CDFs F ∗i (s)F
∗









ds. This is straightforward to compute by again applying the en-
gagement equality and a change of variables. Applying these insights yields the players’
equilibrium utilities and comparative statics.
Proposition 4 In equilibrium,





∣∣∣ xjαj ∣∣∣ (1− pj (εk))), which is
increasing in ideological extremism |xi| and decreasing in costs αi for all i






x2i − (αi − 1) s̄, which is decreasing
in her opponent’s extremism |x−i| and increasing in her opponent’s costs α−i
3. the decisionmaker’s utility is∫ 1
εk
s (ε) · ∂
∂ε
















8The equality Π∗−i (0;F
∗) = Π∗−i (s̄;F






+ 2 |x−iE [yi]| − (α−i − 1) s̄
also generates the average score E [si], since Fi (0) and E [yi] are characterized in Corollaries 3 and 5.
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x2i depends solely on her own parameters, and represents what her utility would
be if she could engage in entrepreneurship absent competition. The second component
− (αi − 1) s̄ is the cost generated by competition, which forces her to develop policies that
are strictly better for the decisionmaker than the reservation policy, in order to maintain her
influence. This cost is increasing in i’s marginal cost αi of developing quality, and increasing
in the intensity of competition, as captured by the maximum score s̄.
The intensity of competition s̄ is affected by the entire profile of parameters in a natural
way. It increases if either entrepreneur becomes more extreme, or if either entrepreneur’s
costs of developing quality decrease.
An interesting implication is that an entrepreneur is worse off if her opponent becomes
more willing or able to compete. In particular, an entrepreneur is harmed if her opponent
becomes more efficient at developing quality, even though quality it is a fully common value
dimension. The reason is that the downside of her opponent’s ability to exploit quality to
achieve noncentrist outcomes outweighs the spillover benefit of the additional quality. Our
results on how −i′s parameters affect i′s utility are consistent with the casual observation,
e.g., from the politics of academic departments, that a faction is often displeased when a
competing faction becomes either more-motivated to exert effort on proposals that will shape
the future direction of the organization, or more-effective at generating such proposals.
6 Special Cases
Even with an analytical characterization and few model parameters, the relationship between
parameters and outcomes is complex. We thus conclude by considering three special cases of
substantive interest: (i) an entrepreneur who is dominant, in the sense of having both more-
extreme preferences and lower costs, (ii) entrepreneurs who are equally engaged but with
different primary motives, where one has a cost advantage and the other is more ideologically-
extreme, and (iii) major asymmetries resulting from very high or low costs, or very moderate
or extreme preferences. To do so we first provide a brief self-contained summary highlighting
the main comparative statics from Corollaries 3–5 and Propositions 3 and 4.
Observation 1 As an entrepreneur i’s costs αi decrease or her extremism |xi| increases,
1. her probability of winning the contest increases
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2. her policies become FOS more extreme and her opponent’s become FOS more moderate
3. her opponent’s utility decreases.
Moreover, the probability that the less-engaged entrepreneur k is active decreases in her own
costs αk and her opponent’s ideological extremism |x−k|, and increases in her opponent’s
costs α−k and her own ideological extremism |xk|.
A key theme of the asymmetric model is that for many outcomes of interest, increasing an
entrepreneur’s extremism or reducing her costs has similar effects. Making an entrepreneur
either more willing or better able to exploit quality investments to realize ideological gains
increases her strength, induces her to develop extreme policies, forces her opponent to develop
moderate policies, and harms her opponent. If she is the less-engaged entrepreneur, she
becomes more likely to be active, whereas if she is already more engaged then she further
drives her opponent out of the contest.
A Dominant Entrepreneur We first consider the special case of a dominant entrepreneur
in terms of parameters (|xk| ≤ |x−k| and α−k ≤ αk with at least one strict inequality).
Recall that i score-dominates the policy contest if she develops policies that are first-order
stochastically better for the decisionmaker, i.e., Fi (s) ≤ F−i (s) , ∀s ∈ [0, s̄] with a strict
inequality for some scores. We also say that entrepreneur i is more ideologically aggressive
if her policies are first-order stochastically more extreme, i.e., Gi (|y|) ≤ G−i (|y|) , ∀y with a
strict inequality for some ideologies. These features are characteristic of competition when
one entrepreneur is dominant.
Corollary 6 If α−k ≤ αk and |x−k| ≥ |xk| , with at least one inequality strict, then en-
trepreneur −k is more engaged, score dominant, and more ideologically aggressive.
Greater engagement and score dominance follow from Proposition 3, which states that










∀p, is a necessary
and sufficient condition for score dominance. This holds when −k is both more extreme and
has lower costs. First order stochastic dominance of ideologies is then an implication: ap-
plying score dominance, entrepreneur −k develops more-extreme policies at every score, i.e.,∣∣y∗−k (s)∣∣ = ∣∣∣ x−kα−k ∣∣∣Fk (s) > ∣∣∣ xkαk ∣∣∣F−k (s) = |y∗k (s)| ∀s, which, combined with score dominance,
implies that she is more ideologically aggressive than her opponent.
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The subcase of an entrepreneur who is dominant due to lower costs (α−k < αk) despite
equally-extreme ideological preferences (xk = x−k) has a natural interpretation. The en-
trepreneurs may represent two competing factions within a firm or agency. Each leans in
favor of one particular approach to a problem, yet one has more staff and money to develop
new policy proposals. In these circumstances, the cost-advantaged entrepreneur exploits her
advantage to develop policies that reflect her ideological preferences. Interestingly, despite
the extremism of her policies, she invests sufficiently in quality to make the decisionmaker
probabilistically favor them; she does not overexploit her advantage.
In the subcase of an entrepreneur who is dominant due to a more-extreme ideology
(|x−k| > xk) despite no greater ability to develop quality (αk = α−k), the model demonstrates
that extremism need not be a vice. Greater extremism induces an entrepreneur to value
marginal ideological gains more, which incentivizes her to produce higher-quality policies.
Her extremism does not induce her to be excessively aggressive; her policies are first-order
stochastically better for the decisionmaker despite their greater extremism, and her extreme
preferences (surprisingly) make her more likely to win the contest.
Equally-Engaged Entrepreneurs with Different Motives Next, we consider entrepreneurs
who are equally engaged (εk = ε−k) but with different primary motives for engagement. Let j
have lower costs (αj < α−j) and −j have more-extreme ideological preferences (|x−j| > |xj|).
For example, j may be a corporate interest group whereas −j is an environmental NGO with
limited resources. The groups’ equal engagement implies that both are always active. How-
ever, their patterns of policy development differ.
Proposition 5 With entrepreneurs who are equally engaged (εj = ε−j) but have different
primary motives for engagement (αj < α−j and |x−j| > |xj|)
1. the cost-advantaged entrepreneur j is score-dominant and more likely to win
2. the more-extreme entrepreneur −j develops a more-extreme policy
∣∣y∗−j (s)∣∣ > ∣∣y∗j (s)∣∣
at every score.
Score dominance of the cost-advantaged entrepreneur follows because they are equally
engaged and her cost advantage becomes magnified at higher scores due to the higher likeli-
hood of enjoying the intrinsic benefits of quality. A straightforward consequence is that she
is more likely to win the contest.
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Demonstrating that the more ideologically-extreme entrepreneur develops more-extreme
policies at every score s (i.e., |y−j (s)| = |x−j |α−j Fj (s) >
|xj |
αj
F−j (s) = |yj (s)|) is more involved.
It is simple to show that she would develop a more ideologically-extreme policy for any






). However, this is
counterbalanced by her lower probability of victory at every score. Nevertheless, it can be
shown that her tendency toward extremism dominates.
These observations have interesting implications for the decisionmaker’s observable choices
among the policies that are developed.
Corollary 7 If entrepreneurs are equally engaged but have different primary motives, the
decisionmaker appears ideologically biased toward the cost-advantaged entrepreneur:
1. the cost-advantaged entrepreneur wins the contest whenever her policy is equally or
more ideologically-extreme than her opponent’s
2. the ideologically-motivated entrepreneur sometimes develops a more ideologically-extreme
policy that loses the contest
3. the cost-advantage entrepreneur wins with probability > 1
2
.
Thus, when the ideology of policies is considered in isolation, the decisionmaker’s policy
choices appear to be biased towards the entrepreneur with greater resources for policy devel-
opment. The cost-advantaged entrepreneur tends to win, and is rewarded with victory when-
ever she develops a policy that is equally or even more ideologically extreme. Conversely, the
ideologically-motivated entrepreneur appears to overreach by sometimes developing a more
ideologically-extreme policy and losing the contest.
These patterns are consistent with common perceptions about competition between
resource-rich interest groups (e.g., firms) and ideologically-motivated ones (e.g., environ-
mental NGOs). However our results are not driven by factors such as backdoor dealings or
quid pro quo lobbying expenditures and campaign contributions that could enable corporate
interest groups to dominate policy making. Nor do our results stem from irrational behavior
by idealistic activists who insist on maintaining ideological purity. Of course, such factors
may well contribute to observed patterns of behavior. But our model shows that these pat-
terns can also arise simply due to preference and cost asymmetries between rational actors
who make productive investments that improve the quality of their policy proposals.
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Major Asymmetries Finally, we consider major asymmetries in parameters, which arise
when an entrepreneur has very high or low costs or has very moderate or extreme prefer-
ences. We first establish that given any of these sources of asymmetry, the less-engaged
entrepreneur k is unlikely to enter the contest. From Corollary 3, we know that her proba-







, and this converges to zero as (i) she becomes
moderate (|xk| → 0), (ii) her cost of producing quality becomes high (αk →∞), (iii) her
opponent’s preferences become extreme (|x−k| → ∞), or (iv) her opponent’s net cost of pro-
ducing quality becomes low (α−k → 1). Thus, equilibrium patterns of activity resemble those
of a 1-entrepreneur game in that the more-engaged entrepreneur −k rarely encounters direct
competition.
A natural question is whether policy outcomes likewise resemble those of a 1-entrepreneur
game. Absent competition, the sole entrepreneur would extract all benefits of quality in the
form of ideological gains, leaving the decisionmaker no better off than under the reservation
policy. We first show that this is indeed the case when the asymmetry is due to the less-
engaged entrepreneur having very moderate preferences or high costs.
Proposition 6 When |xk| → 0 or αk →∞, the decisionmaker’s utility converges to zero.
The scenario of an entrepreneur with very high costs matches Londregan’s (2000) charac-
terization of policymaking in Chile, where both the legislature and the president have formal
proposal power, but the legislature had few resources for policy development. The predic-
tions of our model in this empirical domain are therefore similar to Londregan’s model, in
which only the president can develop high-quality policies.
The scenario of a very moderate entrepreneur demonstrates that there is no benefit
to the decisionmaker from an entrepreneur who perfectly shares her preferences. Such an
entrepreneur stays out of the policy contest because the decisionmaker already represents
her interests. The decisionmaker would actually prefer any entrepreneur who will generate
competition, however extreme, rather than a replica of herself.
Although the benefits of competitive entrepreneurship vanish when a major asymmetry
arises from one entrepreneur’s disengagement, our next result demonstrates that this is not
the case when it arises from very high engagement of her opponent.
Proposition 7 When |x−k| → ∞ or α−k → 1, the decisionmaker’s utility is bounded away
from zero.
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When the absence of activity by one entrepreneur results from the high engagement of
her competitor, the decisionmaker is strictly better off with the possibility of competition.
The reason is simple–the potential for entry by the less-engaged entrepreneur prevents the
more-engaged one from developing policies that are no better than the reservation policy.
If she did so, the less-engaged entrepreneur would develop strictly better policies and win.
Potential competition thus prevents even a highly-dominant entrepreneur from extracting all
the benefits of quality in the form of ideological gains. This observation is crucial for empirical
analyses of competitive policy development–in situations where only one faction routinely
develops proposals, it cannot be concluded that its actions are unaffected by potential activity
from other interested groups.
7 Conclusion
This paper extends the competitive policy entrepreneurship model of Hirsch & Shotts (2015)
to understand the nature of policy competition between asymmetric factions. In the model,
factions have different ideologies or preferences regarding organizational priorities, yet also
agree on certain common objectives. Competing policy developers appeal to a decisionmaker
by making productive, policy-specific investments to improve the quality of their proposals.
We characterize the equilibrium of the resulting all-pay contest played by two competing
entrepreneurs as they generate proposals comprised of two dimensions: ideology and quality.
In the analysis, we also develop techniques that can be applied to other environments in which
actors compete to have their preferred policies enacted by exerting costly up-front effort, e.g.,
lobbying (Jordan & Meirowitz 2012) and valence competition in elections (Wiseman 2006,
Meirowitz 2008, Ashworth & Bueno de Mesquita 2009).
Our analysis suggests several avenues for future work. One possibility is to expand the
number of possible participants in the contest. This is a natural assumption for organiza-
tions in which entrepreneurship occurs at an individual level rather than in teams, or when
entrepreneurs come from outside of the organization (e.g., interest groups developing propos-
als for government policy). It is straightforward to show that when costs are common there
always exists an equilibrium in which the two most ideologically-extreme entrepreneurs play
their equilibrium strategies in the 2-entrepreneur game, while the others are inactive. Hirsch
& Shotts (2015) contains the weaker result for the symmetric model).
A second possible extension would be to allow policy entrepreneurs to buy support using
targeted benefits (pork, as in vote buying models), collective benefits (policy quality, as in
25
our model), or both, and then analyze when they use productive investments in high-quality
proposals rather than wasteful targeted vote buying.
A third and possibly more interesting avenue is to consider aspects of institutional design
in a setting of competitive entrepreneurship. Factors that could be considered our results
include subsidies for policy development, endogenous selection of the entrepreneurs, delega-
tion of the decision to a person with different ideological preferences that are more or less
aligned with one entrepreneur, or the design of the decisionmaking mechanism.
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This Appendix is divided into two parts. Appendix A contains proofs for the main
propositions in the paper, including the analytical characterization of the unique equilibrium
score CDFs contained in Proposition 2. Appendix B proves Lemmas 1 – 4 and Proposition
1, which contains necessary and sufficient conditions for equilibrium of the model.
A Proofs of Main Propositions
Proposition 2 Part 1: We seek a solution to the differential equation in Proposition 1
satisfying the boundary conditions. We rewrite the equation as


















. Letting si (Fi) denote the inverse of Fi (s), observing
that s′i (Fi) =
1
fi(si(Fi))
, substituting in si (Fi) for s, and rearranging yields









(F−i (si (Fi))) .
This is a differential equation on the composite function F−i (si (Fi)) giving entrepreneur
−i’s probability of developing a policy with score less than the score si (Fi) associated with
Fi. The following function with an arbitrary constant c solves the differential equation:
F−i (si (Fi)) = αi + c (α−i − Fi)−
x−i
xi .
From Proposition 1, the boundary condition F−i (si (Fi)) = 1 must be satisfied, as Fi (s̄) =
F−i (s̄) = 1. This implies c = − (αi − 1) (α−i − 1)
x−i
xi . Substituting and rearranging yields(









Finally, substituting Fi (s) back in for Fi yields(





α−i − Fi (s)
α−i − 1
)|x−i|
⇐⇒ εi (F−i (s)) = ε−i (Fi (s)) ,
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i.e., at every score the probabilities of victory must make the entrepreneurs equally engaged.
Part 2. Part 1 proves that there is a unique equilibrium engagement ε (s) associated with
every score, where ε (s) = εi (F−i (s)) = ε−i (Fi (s)). It is simple to verify by taking logs and




















Letting pi (ε) = ε
−1
i (p) = αi − (αi − 1) ε
1
|xi| , we rewrite in terms of the inverse function s (ε)
s′ (ε) = −2
∑
i
(|xi| /αi) · pi (ε)
ε
.
It is then easily verified that
∫ (|xi|/αi)·pi(ε)
ε
= |xi| (ln (ε) + (|xi| /αi) · pi (ε)); thus,













Finally, we set the constant. The score ranges from [0, s̄], and score is a decreasing
function of engagement, so the maximum engagement ε∗ (0) = ε̄ is associated with the
minimum score s = 0. We argue that ε̄ = mini {εi (0)} = εk (0). If the maximum engagement
were lower, then Fi (0) = p−i (ε̄) > p−i (εk (0)) ≥ 0 ∀i and the boundary condition at score 0
fails. If the maximum engagement were higher, then for entrepreneur −k, F−k (0) = pk (ε̄) <
pk (εk (0)) = 0, a contradiction. Hence, C must yield s (εk) = 0. The unique solution can be
divided up among four additive subterms as














· (pi (ε)− pi (εk))
)
.
Entrepreneur i’s score CDF at s is the unique probability such that −i’s engagement equals
ε (s) (the inverse of s (ε)), i.e., Fi (s) = p−i (ε (s)). 
Proposition 3 For sufficiency: ε−k (Fk (s)) = εk (F−k (s)) and ε−k (p) > εk (p)∀p→ Fk (s) >
F−k (s) as εi (p) is decreasing in p. For necessity: ε−k (Fk (s)) = εk (F−k (s)) and Fk (s) >
F−k (s) → ε−k (F−k (s)) > εk (F−k (s)). As F−k (s) maps one to one to [0, 1] (since −k is
always active) we have ε−k (p) > εk (p) ∀p.
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Proposition 4 Part 1. We first show the equilibrium score function s∗ (ε) is increasing in
xi and decreasing in αi ∀ε. Expressing dependence of equilibrium quantities on parameter
q ∈ {xL, xR, αL, αR}, s (ε; q) =
∫ ε
1








dε+ C ′ (q) . (4)
Since the constant is chosen so that s (εk; q) =
∫ εk(q)
1
s′ (ε; q) dε + C (q) = 0 (where εk (q) is
shorthand for εk (0; q))







s′ (εk; q) .





































It is straightforward to see that s (ε; q) is strictly increasing in xi and strictly decreasing in
αi; the functions εi (p) satisfy the comparative statics (and hence εk (0) does), the inverse
functions pi (ε) inherit the same comparative statics in q, so (|xi| /αi) · pi (ε) in the integral
also inherits comparative statics, as does the overall expression.
Part 2. A player’s utility equals her utility from offering s̄ and the comparative statics
follow from Part 1.
















pk (ε) p−k (ε) s




(1− pk (ε) p−k (ε)) s′ (ε) dε, which reduces to the expression in the Proposition. 
Proposition 5 Part 1. From Proposition 2, j is more engaged at p i.f.f. log (εj (p)) −









dq > 0, and by assumption we have equal engagement at





























α−j−p∀p > 0→ εj (0) > ε−j (0), a contradiction.









αj−p = 1 which happens at most once.
So the entrepreneurs can be equally engaged at most two probabilities, which are p = 0
and p = 1. Entrepreneur j is more engaged in a neighborhood around 0 since the en-






(the derivative of the log difference is
positive at 0); hence she is more engaged at all p ∈ (0, 1).
Part 2. We wish to show
x−j
α−j
Fj (s) ≥ xjαjF−j (s) ∀s ∈ [0, s̄] ⇐⇒
x−j
α−j
p−j (ε) ≥ xjαj pj (ε)




equal to the r.h.s. at ε = 0 (as εj = ε−j). Now we show that the derivative of the l.h.s. is
< the derivative of the r.h.s. ∀ε < εj; since both sides are decreasing in ε and equal at εj =








































|xj| is strictly decreasing















∀ε < εj. 
Proposition 6 To show DM utility converges to zero, rewrite the max score from Proposi-
tion 4 as 2
(













, which converges to
0 as αk →∞ or xk → 0, since εk → 1. 




. Since −k only develops policies on her side of 0, k′s utility from any policy
−k develops at a score ≤ ŝ is less than −x2k + ŝ. Thus, rather than staying out (which k









































> 0 as F−k(ŝ)→ 1. 
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B Proofs of Equilibrium Conditions
Lemma 1 Taking the first order condition with respect to yi yields the result. 
Lemma 2 Suppose not, i.e., each player’s strategy generates an atom of size pi at some
common s > 0. Let ȳt denote the expected ideological outcome conditional on the tie at
score s (which depends on both players’ strategies and the decisionmaker’s tiebreaking rule),
and also let F−i (si) = lim
s→s−i
{Fi (s)}. Entrepreneur i’s utility from playing according to her







+ F−−i (s) · Vi (s, E [yi | s]) + p−i · (Vi (s, ȳt)) +
∫
s−i>s
Vi (s−i, y−i) dσ−i
Since the entrepreneurs want to move ideology in strictly opposite directions conditional on
a score, Vk (s, 0) ≥ Vk (s, ȳt) for at least one k. Thus, that k’s utility from playing according







+ F−−k (s) · Vk (s, E [yk | s]) + p−k · Vk (s, 0) +
∫
s−k>s
Vk (s−k, y−k) dσ−k.
Now let y = lim
sk→s−
{y∗k (sk)}; by definition E [yk | s] = y with zero variance maximizes the first







but this in turn is strictly < limsk→s+ {Πk (sk, y∗k (s) ;σ−k)} (because p−k > 0 implies y 6=
lim
sk→s+
{y∗k (sk)}, so tying must be strictly worse than just winning with (s, y∗k (s)). 
Lemma 3 Denote entrepreneur i’s equilibrium utility as U∗i , and suppose not, i.e., Fi (0) >
0 ∀i; this could be due to atoms at 0, developing scores lower than 0, or both. Let ȳt denote
the expected ideological outcome conditional on both players developing scores ≤ 0, which
could be a complicated function of the players’ strategies and the decisionmaker’s tie-breaking
rule. We argue that equilibrium implies ȳt = 0, so both entrepreneurs have a strict incentive
to produce score ε and win with strictly positive probability bounded away from 0.
Entrepreneur i can achieve U∗i by mixing according to her strategy conditional on generat-
ing score ≤ 0, and utility arbitrarily close to limsi→0+ {Πi (si, 0;σ−i)} by developing a policy
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with ε score and ideology at 0. Equilibrium thus requires that U∗i −limsi→0+ {Πi (si, 0;σ−i)} ≥
0. But also observe that
U∗i − lim
si→0+









+ F−i (0) · (Vi (0, ȳt)− Vi (0, 0)) .
Equilibrium thus requires that the r.h.s. be ≥ 0 for both entrepreneurs {i,−i}. But this
then implies that both ȳt ≥ 0 and ȳt ≤ 0, so ȳt = 0 and U∗i = limsi→0+ {Πi (si, 0;σ−i)}. But
then by Lemma 1 limsi→0+ {Πi (si, y∗i (0) ;σ−i)} is strictly higher for both entrepreneurs since
y∗i (0) = F−i (0) · xiαi 6= 0, and they each have a strict incentive to deviate to an ε-higher score
and produce their optimal ideology, a contradiction. 
Lemma 4 We first show that if ŝ > 0 is in the support of Fi then F−i (ŝ)−F−i (ŝ− ε) > 0
∀ε > 0. Suppose not; then ∃ε > 0 such that F−i (s) is constant over [ŝ− ε, ŝ] and −i has no
atom at ŝ−ε or ŝ. Intuitively, this can’t happen because i would be playing scores above ŝ−ε
without getting a higher probability of victory. Formally Πi (ŝ, yi;σ−i)−Πi (ŝ− ε, yi;σ−i) =
− (αi − F−i (ŝ))·ε < 0 ∀yi, implying by an envelope argument that i’s utility from developing
(ŝ− ε, y∗ (ŝ− ε)) is strictly higher than developing (ŝ, y∗ (ŝ)); if ŝ were in the support she
could do strictly better by deviating to (ŝ− ε, y∗ (ŝ− ε)), a contradiction.
Now the preceding argument implies several of the desired properties. If the players’
score CDFs did not have common support over s > 0, then one player would have support
at a score where the other player’s CDF is constant below, violating the condition. If the
common support did not include 0 or were not convex, then there would exist a score s′′ > 0
in the common support and a strictly lower score s′ ≥ 0 such that Fi (s) was constant ∀i over
[s′, s′′), at least one k had Fk (s
′′) = Fk (s
′) (since both cannot have atoms at s′′ by Lemma
2), and the condition would again be violated.
Finally we show that no entrepreneur has an atom above 0 by contradiction. Suppose −i
has an atom at ŝ > 0 of size p−i; then i does not (by Lemma 2) which implies E [y−i | ŝ] =
y∗−i (ŝ) (by Lemma 1). By the argument in the preceding paragraph, i’s support includes [0, ŝ],
which implies Fi (ŝ) > 0 and y
∗
−i (ŝ) 6= 0. In addition, limsi→ŝ− {Πi (si, y∗i (si) ;σ−i)} ≥ U∗i
(since otherwise i would be putting positive probability on scores yielding strictly less utility
than her equilibrium utility). Now let ŷi = limsi→ŝ− {y∗i (si)} 6= 0, i.e., i’s optimal ideology
if she developed score ŝ and expected to always lose a tie. It is easily verified that
lim
si→ŝ+
{Πi (si, ŷi;σ−i)} − lim
si→ŝ−
{Πi (si, y∗i (si) ;σ−i)}
= p−i
(






meaning it would yield utility strictly higher than i’s equilibrium utility to develop ideology
ŷi and score just above ŝ to win for sure, a contradiction. 
Proposition 1 Necessity: We first argue necessity of ideological optimality. Observe that
since the score CDFs are atomless over (0,∞) and at such scores developing (si, y∗i (si)) is
strictly better than any other policy (by Lemma 1), in equilibrium the probability a policy
(si, yi) with si > 0 satisfies yi = y
∗
i (si) must be 1. Ideological optimality then immediately
follows: if Fi (0) = 0 then i’s policies are strictly positive score with probability 1, and if
Fi (0) > 0 then F−i (0) = 0 (by Lemma 3), policies with score si ≤ 0 both lose for sure and
never affect a tie, and therefore must be 0 quality with probability 1.
We next argue necessity of score optimality by deriving the system of differential equations
and boundary conditions. Observe that Lemma 4 (combined with our technical restriction
that score CDFs be the sum of a discrete and absolutely continuous distribution) immediately
imply (i) score CDFs are absolutely continuous over [0, s̄], where s̄ > 0 is the maximum score
and may be =∞, (ii) Fk (0) = 0 for some k ∈ {L,R}, and (iii) lim
s→s̄
{Fi (s)} = 1 ∀i.
Now recall that the function Π∗i (si;F ) over all scores si ≥ 0 is equal to:















This is an entrepreneur’s expected utility were she always to win at a score-tie (with her
opponent or the reservation policy) with the policies y∗i (si) substituted in.
Let σ∗ denote an equilibrium strategy profile, and U∗i denote i’s equilibrium utility in
that profile. At an equilibrium profile there are no atoms above 0, so entrepreneur i’s utility
from developing the optimal policy at any score si > 0 is exactly equal to Π
∗
i (si;F ). The
statement is not necessarily true at si = 0, but i can achieve utility arbitrarily close to
Π∗i (0;F ) by developing a score ε above. Consequently U
∗
i ≥ Π∗i (si;F ) for all si ≥ 0. In
addition, Π∗i (si;F ) ≥ U∗i and thus = U∗i ∀si ∈ [0, s̄]; if instead for some si ∈ [0, s̄] we had
U∗i > Π
∗
i (si;F ) then by continuity of (Fi, F−i) over si > 0 (and right continuity at 0) i
would be developing scores with positive probability that yield strictly lower utility than her
equilibrium utility, a contradiction.
Finally, since (Fi, F−i) are also absolutely continuous and strictly increasing ∀s ∈ [0, s̄]
by full support, U∗i = Π
∗
i (si;F ) ∀si ∈ [0, s̄] ⇐⇒ ∂∂si (Π
∗
i (si;F )) = 0 for almost all s ∈ [0, s̄],
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which yields the pair of differential equations













and thus the conditions for score optimality.
Sufficiency: Suppose the conditions hold. First observe that all policies (si, y
∗
i (si)) s.t.
si ∈ (0, s̄] yield utility equal to a constant Û∗i , since by score optimality Π∗i (si;F ) is constant
over [0, s̄]. We argue that this is i’s utility from playing her strategy. If entrepreneur i
is always active (Fi (0) = 0), then this follows immediately from ideological optimality. If
instead entrepreneur i is sometimes inactive (Fi (0) > 0) then the score optimality boundary
conditions imply that her opponent is always active (F−i (0) = 0). In this case policies (si, yi)
s.t. si ≤ 0 and si+y2i = qi = 0 are free to develop, always lose, and never influence a tie with
the reservation policy. They therefore yield the same utility as developing the reservation
policy Π∗i (0;F ). So again by ideological optimality Û
∗
i is i’s utility from playing her strategy.
We now argue that neither entrepreneur has a profitable deviation in two steps. We first
argue that Û∗i is higher than the utility from any other policy (si, yi) with strictly positive
score si > 0. For any si ∈ (0, s̄] in the common mixing interval we have U∗i = Π∗i (si;F ) =
Π∗i (si, y
∗
i (si) ;F ) ≥ Π∗i (si, yi;F ) by Lemma 1. For any si > s̄ above the common mixing
interval we have that U∗i = Π
∗
i (s̄;F ) > Π
∗




i (si) ;F ) ≥ Π∗i (si, yi;F ) by
Lemma 1 and Π∗i (s̄;F )− Π∗i (si;F ) = (αi − 1) (si − s̄) > 0.
We second argue that Û∗i is higher than the utility from any other policy (si, yi) with
weakly negative score si ≤ 0. Suppose first that entrepreneur i is sometimes inactive (Fi (0) >
0) – then by the boundary conditions her opponent −i is always active (Fi (0) = 0). As
previously argued, if she develops a negative score policy it always loses, and never influences
a tie. Thus, 0-quality negative score policies yield exactly her equilibrium utility Û∗i , while
positive-quality negative score policies are strictly worse.
Finally suppose that entrepreneur i is always active (Fi (0) = 0). If her opponent−i is also
always active, then the same argument applies, so suppose that her opponent is sometimes
inactive (F−i (0) > 0). By ideological optimality, whenever −i develops a 0−score policy it is
exactly the reservation policy. Thus, were i to deviate to developing a strictly negative score
policy si < 0 it would always lose and never influence a (real) tie, so it is weakly or strictly
worse than developing the reservation policy (0, 0) (depending on whether it has positive
quality). Last we argue that U∗i is ≥ i’s utility from developing any policy (0, yi), including
the reservation policy. Let wi (yi) denote the probability policy (0, yi) wins conditional on −i
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being inactive (s−i ≤ 0), which depends on the full profile of strategies (including the DM’s
tie-breaking rule). With the remaining probability the reservation policy must be selected.















Now observe the following. First, this utility is larger at the reservation policy (0, 0) than at
any (0, yi) with sign (yi) 6= sign (xi). Second, at any yi with sign (yi) = sign (xi) (or yi = 0),
the above is ≤ the utility Π∗i (si, yi;F ) from developing (0, yi) and winning for sure when
s−i ≤ 0. Third, by Lemma 1 Π∗i (si, yi;F ) ≤ Π∗i (0;F ), or i’s utility if she were to develop
a 0−score policy with the optimal ideology presuming she would always win a tie. Finally,
CDFs satisfying score optimality are right continuous, so i’s equilibrium utility U∗i is equal
to Π∗i (0;F ); thus, no (0, yi) or (si, yi) with si < 0 yields a profitable deviation. 
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